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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SEARCHING FOR THE PROPER BAL­
ANCE IN DEFINING A MIRANDA INTERROGATION: THREE PERSPEC­
TIVES ON RHODE ISLAND V. INN.IS, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Miranda v. Arizona,l the United States Supreme Court . 
held that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether excul­
patory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the 
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination."2 The 
Court also stated in dictum, 3 "[i]f the individual states that he 
wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is 
present."4 Recently, in Rhode Island v. Innis,S the United States 
Supreme Court held that the "term interrogation under Miranda 
refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or ac­
tions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant 
to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. "6 The 
Court defined "interrogation" from the viewpoint of the police 
rather than from the perspective of the suspect or of a reasonable 
person in the position of the suspect. Innis joins other Burger 
Court decisions in a "fundamental rejection of the premises of 
Miranda . ..."7 Innis also rejects an approach advanced by Justice 
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2. Id. at 444. The procedural safeguards include warning the defendant that 
"he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as ev­
idence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either re­
tained or appointed." Id. 
3. The directive is dictum because none of the cases before the Court in 
Miranda involved a defendant who asked to consult with counsel. A technical read­
ing of Miranda thus would enable the Court in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 
(1980), to label the Miranda directive as not controlling. The Court has not used this 
approach in dealing with subsequent Miranda issues since Harris \T' New York, 401 
U.S. 222 (1971). See Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. 
CT. REV. 99, 107-08 (1977). Notably, the Innis Court refused to utilize the dictum ap­
proach. Instead, the Court phrased the issue as "whether the respondent was 'inter­
rogated' by the police officers in violation of the respondent's undisputed right un­
der Miranda to remain silent until he had consulted with a lawyer." 446 U.S. 291, 
298 (1980). 
4. 384 U.S. at 474. 
5. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
6. Id. at 301. 
7. Stone, supra note 3, at 168. For a discussion of the Burger Court treatment of 
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Stevens that more faithfully adheres to the concerns underlying 
Miranda. 8 
On January 17, 1975 at about 4:30 a.m.,9 Thomas Innis was ar­
rested at gunpoint10 by a Providence police officer on a public 
street for the kidnapping, robbery, and murder of a cab driver that 
had occurred a few days earlier. ll Although all three crimes had 
been committed with a shotgun, Innis did not have the gun when 
arrested. 12 The arresting officer promptly handcuffed Innis13 and, 
pursuant to Miranda,14 advised him of his constitutional rights, 
including the right to speak to an attorney. IS When two other offi­
cers repeated the warnings,16 Innis stated that he wanted to see an 
attorney.17 The police then ceased interrogation18 and placed Innis 
in a car for the ride to headquarters. 19 The officer in charge in­
structed the three patrolmen accompanying Innis not to question 
or coerce the latter in any way during the ride. 20 En route to the 
station one of the officers stated, "'there's a lot of handicapped 
children running around in this area, and God forbid one of them 
might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt them­
selves.' "21 Innis, who clearly was able to hear the conversation, 
asked the police to return to the scene of the arrest so that he 
could show them where the shotgun was hidden. 22 The patrol 
wagon returned to the scene of the arrest where Innis again was 
warned of his rights. He acknowledged that he understood them 
Miranda, see note 191 infra. 
8. See 446 U.S. at 307-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' dissent is 
discussed in text accompanying notes 195-206 infra. 
9. [d. at 293-94. 
10. Brief of the Respondent Innis at 4, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 291. 
11. [d. at 295. 
12. [d. at 294. 
13. Brief of the Respondent Innis at 4, Rhode Island v. Innis, id. at 291. 
14. [d. 
15. For a full discussion of the Miranda rights and the procedures that must be 
followed once the rights are invoked, see text accompanying notes 67-72 infra. 
16. 446 U.S. at 294. 
17. [d. 
18. 391 A.2d U58, U69 (1978) (Kelleher, J., dissenting), vacated, 446 U.S. at 
291. 
19. [d. at 294. 
20. [d. 
21. [d. at 294-95. Two other versions of the conversation were related by the 
other police officers in the car. According to one version, the police officer said, 
" '[Ilt would be too bad if the little ... girl-would pick up the gun, maybe kill her­
self.' " [d. at 295. See also White, Rhode Island v. Innis: The Significance of a Sus­
pect's Assertion of His Right to Counsel, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53 n.7 (1979). 
22. 446 U.S. at 295. 
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and then led the police to the hidden shotgun. 23 At the time Innis 
indicated that the officers should tum back, the car had traveled no 
more than a mile from the scene of the arrest and only a few min­
utes had elapsed. 24 
At the murder trial the judge assumed, without deciding, that 
the police conversation constituted an interrogation. 25 Although 
Miranda prohibits police interrogation of a custodial suspect after 
the suspect has invoked his right to an attorney,26 the trial judge 
held that Innis' Miranda rights had not been violated. The judge 
concluded that, although Innis had invoked his Miranda right to an 
attorney, he had waived his rights by leading the police to the 
buried gun27 before consulting with counsel. Without determining 
whether the police had interrogated Innis, the court allowed the 
gun to be admitted into evidence. The jury returned verdicts of 
guilty on all charges. 28 
On ~eal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the 
murder conViction, holding that the "handicapped child conversa­
tion" amounted to an interrogation at a time when interrogation 
was prohibited by Miranda. 29 The court also held that Innis had 
not waived his Miranda rights; thus, the shotgun should not have 
been admitted into evidence. 30 
The United States Supreme Court held that the contested 
conversation was not an interrogation within the meaning of 
Miranda. According to the Court, the term "interrogation" under 
Miranda refers both to express questioning and to anything reason­
ably likely to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect. 31 
Justice White concurred, preferring to reverse the judgment for 
the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Brewer v. 
Williams. 32 The court refused to adopt his Brewer views and J us­
23. Id. 
24. [d. 
25. Id. at 308 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
26. 384 U.S. at 444-45. 
27. 446 U.S. at 308 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
28. Id. at 296. 
29. 391 A.2d at 1162. 
30. Id. at 1164. 
31. 446 U.S. at 301. 
32. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). As discussed more fully in the text accompanying 
notes 97-106 infra, defendant Williams was indicted on abduction charges and then 
was accompanied by police officers on a 160-mile ride back to Des Moines where 
his arrest warrant had been issued. Id. at 392. Prior to the trip, Williams was advised 
by a local attorney not to make any statements about the abduction until he had 
consult,ed with a Des Moines attorney. Id. at 391. During the ride, however, 
790 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:787 
tice White joined the Innis opinion in order to reverse the state 
court decision. Chief Justice Burger also concurred in the judg­
ment. 33 He felt the Innis result was "not inconsistent with 
Miranda . . . . "34 Although the Chief Justice concurred in the de­
cision, he expressed fear that the Court's test would introduce new 
elements of uncertainty in establishing the boundaries of 
Miranda. 3s Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented on the ground 
that the Court had misapplied its own test. They were in substan­
tial agreement with the majority's definition of interrogation. 36 
They understood the majority opinion to require "an objective in­
quiry into the likely effect of police conduct on a typical individual, 
taking into account any special susceptibility of the suspect to cer­
tain kinds of pressure of which the police know or have reason to 
know."37 Justices Marshall and Brennan were "utterly at a loss, 
however, to understand how this objective standard as applied to 
the [Innis] facts ... can rationally lead to the conclusion that there 
was no interrogation ...."38 They continued, "the notion that such 
an appeal [by the police officer to the conscience of Innis] could 
not be expected to have any effect unless the suspect were known 
to have some special interest in handicapped children verges on 
the ludicrous. "39 
Justice Stevens dissented to the new definition of interrogation 
and advanced an alternative. Under his definition any statement 
"that would normally be understood by the average listener as call-
Williams made incriminating statements after one of the officers delivered the infa­
mous "Christian burial speech." [d. at 393. In a 5 to 4 decision, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that Williams' sixth amendment right to counsel had been vio­
lated at the time he made the incriminating remarks and that no waiver of that right 
had occurred. [d. at 406. Justice White dissented on the ground that Williams had 
made a knowing and intentional waiver of his sixth amendment right when he chose 
to make the incriminating statements in the absence of his attorney. [d. at 435. Jus­
tice White felt that implicit in the majority's holding was the suggestion that the 
sixth amendment creates a right not to be asked any questions in counsel's absence 
rather than a right not to answer any questions in counsel's absence and that the 
right not to be asked questions must be waived before the questions are asked. In 
Justice White's view, "Absent coercion ... an accused is amply protected by a rule 
requiring waiver before or simultaneously with the giving by him of an answer or 
the making by him of a statement." [d. at 436-37. 
33. 446 U.S. at 304 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
34. [d. 
35. [d. 
36. [d. at 305. (Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting). 
37. [d. 
38. [d. 
39. [d. at 305. 
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ing for a response40 •.. as well as those [statements] that are de­
signed to do so, should be considered interrogation. "41 Justice Ste­
vens also dissented to the application of the new majority test to 
Innis' facts. In his view, the trial record was incomplete because 
the trial judge had assumed, but failed to decide, whether an inter­
rogation had occurred. Justice Stevens felt that the proper proce­
dure would be to remand the case to the trial court for findings di­
rected at the new standard. 42 
This note maintains that the Rhode Island Supreme Court's 
finding of interrogation was based upon an inapposite United States 
Supreme Court case, an improper subjective standard, and an in­
complete analysis of the circumstances under which the interroga­
tion occurred. Despite these shortcomings, the final conclusion of 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court can be supported by an objec­
tive, reasonable person standard. 43 Under this standard the court 
would fully analyze the atmosphere of coercion created by the po­
lice and determine whether a reasonable person in Innis' position 
would feel compelled to retrieve the missing shotgun following the 
police conversation. The objective, reasonable person approach is 
the best test for interrogation analysis because it adheres to the un­
derlying rationale of Miranda. It continues to provide the custodial 
suspect with meaningful protection against compelled self-incrim­
ination induced by police pressures. The United States Supreme 
Court majority's treatment of the Innis interrogation issue repre­
sents a significant departure from the foundations of Miranda and 
should be reconsidered. 
II. MIRANDA AND ITS BACKGROUND 
A. Pre-Miranda Treatment of the Fifth Amendment 
The fifth amendment provides, in part, that no person "shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself 
. . . ."44 The Supreme Court has interpreted the amendment to 
prohibit the prosecution45 from compelling self-incriminating an­
40. ld. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
41. ld. at 311. 
42. ld. at 314. 
43. This test has been used by numerous lower courts in analyzing the custo­
dial issue. See Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888 (Alaska 1979) (collecting cases). The 
same test should be used in analyzing the interrogation issue. See footnote 187 infra. 
44. U.S. CONST. amend. v. 
45. In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the Court held that the fifth amend­
ment privilege applied to the states and that the standards underlying the privilege 
applied to state court proceedings. ld. at 6. 
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swers in civil or criminal proceedings, whether judicial or extraju­
dicial, if such answers might be used against the individual in a 
criminal trial. 46 The amendment prohibits only compelled self­
incrimination. Thus, in the absence of official coercion, self­
incriminating statements do not conflict with the constitutional 
guarantee. 47 
Prior to Miranda, the Court struggled to articulate a standard 
against which to judge the admissibility of confessions obtained 
through police interrogation. The Court had long recognized the 
importance of confes'sions to law enforceIl!ent efforts. 48 The Court 
had become increasingly disturbed with gross violations of constitu­
tional rights by overzealous police officers. For example, in Brown 
v. Mississippi,49 a state homicide conviction was based upon a con­
fession obtained through physical torture. 50 The Court found the 
whole procedure "revolting to the sense of justice" and ruled it in 
violation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause. 51 In 
1931, a congressional commission studying law enforcement con­
firmed the Court's fears that unrestricted custodial police interro­
gations resulted in untrustworthy confessions and loss of public 
confidence in the criminal justice system. In the words of the 
commission: 
[~]ot only does the use of the third degree involve a flagrant vio­
lation of law by the officers of the law, but it involves also the 
dangers of false confessions, and it tends to make police and 
prosecutors less zealous in the search for objective evidence .... 
"If you use your fists, you are not so likely to use your wits." 
. . . "ne third degree brutalizes the police, hardens the pris­
oner against society, and lowers the esteem in which the admin­
istration of justice is held by the public."52 
46. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Amdstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (privilege upheld in 
bankruptcy proceeding) in which the Court stated, "The privilege is not ordinarily 
dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is 
to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer 
might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it." See also Quinn v. 
United States, 349 U.S. 155, 163 (1955) (Congressional inquiry). 
47. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977). 
48. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 578-80 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., writ­
ing the majority opinion in which Stewart, J., joined). 
49. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 

SO. ld. at 284. 

51. ld. at 286. 
'52. IV National Comm'n on Law Observance & Enforcement, Rep. on Lawless­
ness in Law Enforcement 5 (1931) (Wickersham Repo~). 
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During the thirty years following Brown, the Court developed 
. a test requiring examination of the "totality of the circumstances" to 
determine the voluntariness of a confession obtained through police 
interrogation.53 The voluntariness test "proved to be highly subtle 
and elusive. "54 The courts had to examine numerous variables in 
order to balance police behavior in obtaining the confession against 
the ability of the accused to decide freely whether to admit, to 
deny, or to refuse to answer.55 The courts considered such factors 
as: Duration and nature of the incommunicado custody; presence 
or absence of advice concerning the defendant's constitutional 
rights; and granting or refusing requests to communicate with law­
yers, relatives, or friends. 56 Many state courts used the ambiguity 
of the "totality ·of the circumstances" concept to uphold confessions 
that, if not clearly unconstitutional, were of questionable validity. 57 
For example, in Davis v. North Carolina,58 the North Carolina Su­
perior and Supreme Courts held a confession to be voluntary, de­
spite police notations on the arrest sheet stating, "Do not allow 
anyone to see Davis. Or allow him to use the telephone ...";59 
and despite the fact that no one but the police spoke to Davis dur­
ing the sixteen days of detention and interrogation that preceded 
his confession. 60 
It thus appeared inevitable that the Court would seek "some 
automatic device by which the potential evils of incommunicado in­
terrogation [could] be controlled."61 The Court took a major step 
toward this goal by holding in Massiah v. United States62 that a 
post-indictment interrogation was a "critical stage" of the prosecu­
tion to which the sixth amendment right to counsel attached. 63 
Thus, incriminating statements elicited from the accused after he 
had been indicted but before he had consulted with counsel were 
53. Stone, supra note 3, at 102. 
54. Id. 
55. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 534 (White, J., with Harlan & Stewart, JJ., 
dissenting). 
56. Id. 
57. Stone, supra note 3, at 102. 
58. 221 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1963), aff'd, 339 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964), 
rev'd, 384 U.S. 737 (1966). 
59. Id. at 744. 
60. Id. at 745. 
61. Stone, supra I}ote 3, at 103 n.21. 
62. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
63. Id. at 205-06. 
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excluded. 64 One month later, the Court in Escobedo v. Illinois65 
seemed to extend the reach of the sixth amendment right to coun­
sel to pre-indictment interrogations. The precise scope of Escobedo 
was left unclear because the Court expressly limited its holding to 
the facts at hand. 66 
B. Miranda 
Two years after issuing Escobedo, the United States Supreme 
Court shifted its focus from the sixth to the fifth amendment and 
issued Miranda. The Court felt compelled to "apply more exacting 
restrictions than [that employed by] the Fourteenth Amendment's 
voluntariness test" in determining the admissibility of confessions 
resulting from police interrogation. 67 The Court was concerned 
with the "inherently compelling pressures which ... undermine 
the individual's will to resist and ... [which] compel him to speak 
where he would not otherwise do so freely [during custodial inter­
rogation. ]"68 The Court concluded that, to offset the coercive pres­
sures inherent in custodial interrogation and to safeguard the fifth 
amendment right against the "potentiality for compulsion," the 
prosecution in a criminal case could not use statements, whether 
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation 
of the suspect unless it demonstrated the use of procedures effec­
tive to protect the fifth amendment privilege. 69 These procedures 
64. ld. at 206. As discussed more fully at text accompanying notes 129-135 
infra, the sixth amendment ensures that after a certain point the accused must be 
shielded from the state by an attorney. This shield requires the state to establish 
guilt by evidence independently and freely secured. The State may not prove its 
charge against the accused by coercing statements from him. It thus becomes impor­
tant tor sixth amendment purposes to determine at what point of the prosecution an 
accused is constitutionally entitled to have an attorney present during his meeting 
with the state. 
65. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
66. Stone, supra note 3, at 103. The Escobedo Court held that 
where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an 
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect 
has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interro­
gations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has 
requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and 
the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional 
right to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the Assistance of Coun­
sel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution .... 
378 U.S. at 490-91. 
67. 384 U.S. at 511 (Harlan, J., with Stewart & White, JJ., dissenting). 
68. ld. at 467. 
69. ld. at 444. 
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included warning the individual prior to questioning that he had a 
right to remain silent, that any statement he made could be used 
as evidence against him, and that he had a right to the assistance of 
counsel, retained or appointed. 70 The suspect could waive these 
rights if the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelli­
gently.71 If the individual indicated in any manner at any stage of 
the process that he wished either to consult an attorney or not to 
be questioned, the interrogation had to cease. 72 
The aim of the Miranda safeguards was to eliminate all pres­
sures beyond those inherent in arrest and detention. 73 The coer­
cive pressures produced solely by arrest and detention were not 
found to be substantial enough to require Miranda's "protective" 
warnings. 74 Instead, the Court believed that the level of compul­
sion that would jeopardize exercise of the privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination was reached when both custody and 
interrogation were present. The Court recognized that the inter­
play between police interrogation and police custody, each condi­
tion reinforcing the pressures and anxieties produced by the other, 
made custodial police interrogation devastating for the suspect. 75 
The Court stated, "An individual swept from familiar surroundings 
into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and sub­
jected to the techniques of persuasion described cannot be other­
wise than under compulsion to speak. "76 
If one of the components, interrogation or custody, is missing 
there is no custodial interrogation. Statements made to the police 
in such circumstances are admissible regardless of whether 
Miranda warnings were given. Thus, volunteered statements of 
any kind are not barred by the fifth amendment and are not af­
fected by the Miranda holding. 77 They do not result from an inter­
rogation because police-induced pressures have not impaired the 
capacity of the defendant to decide ra,tionally whether to speak to 
70. The Miranda Court recognized that the Constitution does not require any 
particular solution to the problem of ensuring compliance with the fifth amendment. 
The Court thus declared that other procedures can be used which are at least as ef­
fective in apprising the accused of his fifth amendment rights. 384 U.S. at 467:­
71. Id. at 444. 
72. Id. 
73. Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What is "Interroga­
tion"? When Does it Matter?, 67 CEO. L.J. 1, 18 (1978). 
74. Id. at 18 n.1l2. 
75. Id. at 63. 
76. 384 U.S. at 461. 
77. Id. at 478. 
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the police. 78 Similarly, statements obtained through police inter­
views conducted in the home of the suspect, where the suspect is 
free to terminate the meeting, are not affected by the decision. 
There is no custody because the suspect has not been cut off from 
the outside world and subjected to compulsion within the meaning 
of Miranda. 79 
Miranda defined custodial interrogation as questioning initi­
ated by law enforcement officers after a person had been taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any sig­
nificant way.80 Through this definition and the safeguards outlined 
above, Miranda sought to harmonize the public interest in discov­
ery and punishment of criminal offenders with the individual inter­
est in freedom from compulsory self-incrimination. Dissatisfaction 
with the balance struck by Miranda, however, was clearly evident. 
Dissenting, Justice White wrote, "Even if the new concept can be 
said to have adv~ntages of some sort-over the present law, they are 
far outweighed by its likely undesirable impact on other very rele­
vant and important interests. "81 
C. Application of Miranda 
Tension between law enforcement needs, fifth amendment in­
terests, and confusion over the proper definition of "custodial in­
terrogation" exists today as in 1966 when Miranda was decided. 82 
78. ld. at 465. 
79. See Kamisar;supra note 73, at 68. 
80. 384 U.S. at 444. 
81. Id. at 539 (White, J., with Harlan & Stewart, J]., dissenting). According to 
Justice White, the Miranda decision would have several undesirable consequences. 
First, with loss of protection of the criminal law, people would engage in violent 
self-help, employing guns, knives, and the help of sympathetic neighbors. Second, 
the decision would have a corrosive effect on the criminal law as an effective device 
to prevent crime: "[tlhe easier it is to get away with rape and murder, the less the de­
terrent effect on those who are inclined to attempt it." Id. at 543. Third, release of a 
defe~dant who has confessed or would do so in response to noncoercive questioning 
might constitute a callous disregard for his welfare because no attempt would be 
made to help him following his confession. Fourth, the decision might delay release 
of the innocent because an individual arrested on probable cause would no longer 
be able to extricate himself quickly by listening to the circumstances of his arrest 
and explaining his own actions. These acts would have to await the hiring or ap­
pointment of an attorney, consultations with counsel, and a session with the police. 
Finally, the decision would slow down the investigation and apprehension of con­
federates in cases where time is of the essence, particularly those involving national 
security or organized crime. Id. at 542-44. 
82. See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970) for lengthy treatment of "cus­
todial" cases. See Criminal Procedure-Interrogation in Violation of Miranda-State 
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Courts have differed in their treatment of the interrogation issue. 
For example, jurisdictions disagree over whether the reading of a 
ballistic report to a defendant constitutes an interrogation. In 
Combs v. Wingo,83 the Sixth Circuit held that such a reading was 
an implied question, hence an interrogation.84 The opposite con­
clusion was reached by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Combs v. 
Commonwealth. 85 Similarly, courts disagree over the significance 
of a confrontation between codefendants. In People v. Doss,8s the 
court ruled that no interrogation occurred when defendant was 
brought into the presence of codefendant who told defendant to 
reveal the location of the weapon. 87 In Commonwealth v. Hamil­
ton,88 however, the court held that an interrogation took place 
when the police arranged a confrontation between defendant and 
the accomplice at which the accomplice accused defendant of the 
crime.89 
Innis required the Rhode Island Supreme Court to clarify the 
meaning of interrogation, left unresolved by Miranda. The factual 
setting in which Innis' interrogation took place demonstrates the 
need for continued judicial review of the balance Miranda struck 
between law enforcement needs and fifth amendment protections. 
In light of the difficulty that courts have had in striking the perfect 
balance between these two interests, Innis presented the Rhode Is­
land Supreme Court with a challenging task. 
III. RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT DECISION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court began its treatment of Innis 
by finding that defendant was in custody at the time of the police­
initiated "handicapped child conversation. "90 Thus, the first prong 
of the Miranda custodial interrogation test was met. The court 
then determined that an interrogation violating Miranda had 
occurred.91 The violation was predicated on two factors. First, the 
v. Innis, 13 SUFFOLK L. REV. 591 (1979) for compilation of federal and state court 
treatment of "interrogation" cases. 
83. 465 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1972). 
84. [d. at 99. 
85. 438 S.W.2d 82, 84-85 (Ky. 1969). 
86. 44 Ill. 2d 541, 256 N.E.2d 753 (1970). 
87. Id. at 54445, 256 N.E.2d at 755-56. 
88. 445 Pa. 292, 285 A.2d 172 (1971). 
89. Id. at 297, 285 A.2d at 175. 
90. 391 A.2d at 1161. 
9l. As noted in text accompanying note 72 supra, Miranda prohibits further in­
terrogation if an individual indicates that he wishes to consult with an attorney in 
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court was persuaded by the factual similarities between Innis and 
Brewer v. Williams. 92 Second, a subjective evaluation of the cir­
cumstances under which the police conversation took place, as 
viewed by the present defendant, indicated that Innis had been in­
terrogated. 
A. Reliance on Brewer 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding is assailable on 
several grounds, even though its conclusion can be supported by 
the applIcation of a different test. 93 First, the state court empha­
sized that the United States Supreme Court had upheld a finding 
of interrogation in Williams in a factual setting that differed from 
Innis in "constitutionally insignificant [ways]. "94 Although the cases 
were similar in several respects, the United States Supreme Court 
decided Williams on sixth and not fifth amendment grounds and 
the discussion of interrogation was considered "constitutionally ir­
relevant."95 The Williams Court, however, seemed to confuse the 
fifth and sixth amendments. 96 The Rhode Island Supreme Court's 
use of Wil{iaTns as support for its finding of an interrogation in 
Innis, therefore, is understandable. 
In Williams, defendant was arraigned on abduction charges in 
Davenport, Iowa and accompanied by two police officers on a 
160-mile ride to Des Moines, where the abduction arrest warrant 
had been issued. 97 Prior to the drive, Williams spoke with a Des 
Moines attorney. The attorney instructed Williams not to discuss 
the abduction with the police. The lawyer also obtained a promise 
from Detective Learning that the latter would not interrogate 
Williams on the trip to Des Moines. 98 En route, Detective 
Learning, who believed that the abducted girl was dead and who 
the course of a custodial interrogation. This safeguard exists in addition to the warn­
ing about the right to counsel that must be given before the police begin a custodial 
interrogation. Innis requested counsel but had not yet seen an attorney when the 
handicapped child conversation occurred. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held 
that the conversation constituted an interrogation which had occurred before the po­
lice complied with Innis' request for counsel. 391 A.2d at 1162. 
92. 430 U.S. at 387. 
93. See text accompanying notes 193-206 infra. 
94. 391 A.2d at 1162. 
95. Kamisar, supra note 73, at 4. 
96. Id. at 33. 
97. 430 U.S. at 391-92. 
98. Id. at 401 n.8. But see Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams-A Hard 
Look at a Discomfiting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209, 212 n.23 (1977), in which the au­
thor maintains that the record does not indicate that such an agreement was made. 
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knew that Williams was deeply religious and a former mental pa­
tient, delivered the infamous "Christian burial speech."99 Ad­
dressing Williams as "Reverend," Leaming stressed that the par­
ents of the abducted child were entitled to have a Christian burial 
for their daughter. 100 Williams was told not to answer but to "think 
about it. "101 As the car approached Des Moines, Williams indi­
cated that he would take the police to the body.102 At the murder 
trial, the judge admitted evidence related to statements Williams 
had made in the car on the ground that Williams had waived his 
sixth amendment right to counsel. 103 
The United States Supreme Court held that Williams was de­
prived of his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to counsel. 104 
The sixth amendment states, "in all criminal prosecutions, the ac­
cused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for 
his defense. "105 The Court found no waiver by Williams of these 
rights. lOS The Court also stated that there was no need to review 
the doctrine of Miranda, designed to secure the fifth amendment 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, because of the sixth 
107amendment violation in the case.
In Williams, the Supreme Court said that the sixth amend­
ment case of Massiah v. United States108 gives an individual the 
right to legal representation during interrogation once adversary 
proceedings against him have commenced. 109 The Court found that 
judicial proceedings against Williams had commenced before the 
start of the ride to Des Moines because an arrest warrant had been 
issued upon which Williams had been arraigned. 110 The Court 
then found that the Christian burial speech was "tantamount to in­
terrogation" and that no sixth amendment right would have at­
tached "if there had been no interrogation. "111 
The sixth amendment rule of Massiah was enunciated incor­
99. 430 U.S. at 392. 
100. Id. at 393. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 394. 
104. Id. at 397-98. 
105. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
106. 430 U.S. at 404. 
107. Id. at 397. 
108. 377 U.S. at 201. 
109. 430 U.S. at 401. 
110. Id. at 399. 
111. Id. at 400. 
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rectly by the Williams Court. 112 Massiah held that, once adversary 
proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has a right 
to legal representation whether or not the government interrogates 
him.1l3 Massiah involved no police "interrogation" as the term is 
normally used because there were no compelling influences pre­
sent.1l4 Instead, Massiah involved a defendant who, after being in­
dicted and released on bail, made incriminating statements while 
talking with his codefendant in a car owned by the latter. 115 A ra­
dio transmitter had been installed in the car to enable federal 
agents, with whom codefendant was cooperating, to overhear the 
conversation. 116 The Court held that defendant was denied his 
sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel when "there was 
used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating 
words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him 
after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel. "117 
The Massiah Court relied upon language in Spano v. United 
States .118 The Spano Court struck a confession based upon the to­
tality of the circumstances under which the confession had been 
obtained. 119 The police obtained the Spano confession through a 
jailhouse interrogation that occurred after indictment and in the 
absence of counsel. Four concurring Justices in Spano advanced 
the view that the right to assistance of counsel attaches once a per­
son is formally charged, or once adversary proceedings otherwise 
have been initiated against him.12o Unless the right to assistance of 
counsel is waived, any incriminating statements made in the ab­
sence of counsel in such circumstances will be excluded. 121 The 
views of the Spano concurring Justices appeared to form the basis 
of Massiah. 122 
112. See Kamisar, supra note 73, at 33. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. 377 U.S. at 202-03. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 206. 
118. Id. at 204-06 (relying on Spano v. United States, 360 U.S. 315 (1959)). 
119. Id. at 323. 
120. Id. at 324 (Douglas, J., with Black & Brennan, H., concurring); id. at 326 
(Stewart, J., with Douglas & Brennan, H., concurring). 
121. Id. at 324 (Douglas, J., with Black & Brennan, H., concurring); id. at 326 
(Stewart, J., with Douglas & Brennan, H., concurring). 
122. The Massiah Court noted that the Spano opinion rested upon the totality 
of the circumstances under which the confession had been obtained. The Massiah 
majority then quoted considerable portions of the Spano concurrences and stated 
that the view of concurring Justices reflected a constitutional principle that had been 
broadly reaffirmed by the Court since Spano. 377 U.S. at 205. 
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It was immaterial to the Massiah Court whether the incriminat­
ing statements were elicited in a coercive or noncoercive setting. 123 
The Court found it irrelevant that in Spano: 
The defendant was interrogated in a police station, while here 
[in Massiah] the damaging testimony was elicited from the de­
fendant without his knowledge ..."if such a rule [the rule advo­
cated by the concurring justices in Spano] is to have any efficacy 
it must apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well 
as those conducted in the jailhouse . . . . "124 
The timing of the governmental efforts to obtain incriminating 
statements was significant to the Massiah Court. To stress its con­
cern over the element of timing, the Court cited language from 
Powell v. Alabama:125 "during .... the most critical period of the 
proceedings ... that is to say, from ... arraignment until the be­
ginning of their trial, when consultation, ... investigation and 
preparation [are] vitally important, the defendants ... [are] ... 
entitled to such aid [of counsel] during that pe,riod as at the trial it­
self. "126 Thus, in Massiah the indicted defendant clearly was enti­
tled to the assistance of counsel at the time of the surreptitious po­
lice activity. The absence of counsel at this time led the Court to 
exclude defendant's incriminating statements. 
Massiah demonstrates that the presence of a fifth amendment 
kind of interrogation127 is immaterial in sixth amendment cases. 
The United States Supreme Court in Innis made a similar observa­
.tion. The Court indicated that the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
erred in looking to Brewer for guidance in defining a Miranda in­
terrogation. The Court stated that "[t]he definitions of 'interroga­
tion' under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, if indeed the term 
'interrogation' is even apt in the Sixth Amendment context, are not 
necessarily interchangeable, since the policies underlying the two 
constitutional protections are quite distinct. "128 
This statement becomes clearer when the underlying ration­
ales for the fifth and sixth amendments are examined. The sixth 
123. See Kamisar, supra note 73, at 4l. 
124. 377 U.S. at 206. 
125. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
126. 377 U.S. at 205 (quoting language from Powell v. Alabama, id). 
127. For fifth amendment purposes, interrogation is defined as police-induced 
pressures which impair the defendant's capacity to decide rationally whether to 
speak to the police about the alleged offense. See text accompanying notes 68 & 78 
supra. 
128. 446 U.S. at 300 n.4. 
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amendment ensures that the defendant has legal, assistance in any 
critical confrontation with the state after judicial proceedings have 
begun. 129 Counsel helps the defendant to make wise decisions in 
preparing his case and shields him from state efforts to obtain self­
incriminating evidence. 13o The amendment thus can be read to im­
ply that, after a certain point, a criminal proceeding becomes accu­
satorial rather than inquisitorial: 131 In Rogers v. Richrrwnd132 it 
was held that, under the accusatorial system, "the State must es­
tablish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and 
may not by.coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his 
own mouth. "133 While our system has inquisitorial attributes, such 
as police interrogation, investigative grand juries, and undercover 
surveillance, the sixth amendment has been read to prohibit these 
activities after the accusatorial process has begun. 134 
To summarize, if police talk with the defendant after the be­
ginning of judicial proceedings, it is the timing of the conversation 
that brings the sixth amendment into play. Once the sixth amend­
ment attaches it prohibits all police efforts, if they are "tantamount 
to interrogation," to obtain self-incriminating evidence from the de­
fendant. 1as 
Even if the sixth amendment is not applicable to a factual set­
ting because judicial proceedings have not yet begun, the fifth 
amendment right against compelled self-incrimination might apply. 
In contrast to the sixth amendment, which is concerned with the 
timing of police conversations with the accused, the fifth amend­
ment is concerned solely with coercion in a confrontation between 
the police and the accused. 136 Fifth amendment analysis differs 
from sixth amendment analysis because the fifth prohibits only 
compelled self-incrimination, regardless of when it occurs. Thus, 
129. Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional 
Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv, 1, 16 (1979). 
130. ld. at 9-10. 
131. ld. at 23. 
132. 365 U.S. 534 (1961). 
133. ld. at 541 (1961). 
134. Grano, supra note 129, at 24. Language from Massiah supports this view: 
lilt was pointed out [in Spano] that under our system of justice the most ele­
mental concepts of due process of law contemplate that an indictment be 
followed by a trial, "in an orderly courtroom, presided over by a judge, open 
to the public, and protected by all the procedural safeguards of the law." 
377 U.S. at 204. 
135. Grano, supra note 129, at 10. 
136. See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra. 
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the question of interrogation need not be resolved identically for 
fifth and sixth amendment purposes. Fifth amendment interroga­
tion includes only police conduct exerting a compelling influence 
on the accused that impairs the accused's capacity to determine 
whether to remain silent. l37 Interrogation for the sixth amendment 
includes all police conduct likely to elicit incriminating evidence 
from the defendant that occurs after judicial proceedings have 
begun. l3s 
It is clear, therefore, that the Williams Court's characterization 
of the Christian burial speech as "tantamount to interrogation" was 
dicta since it had no relevance to the sixth amendment holding of 
the case. l39 The Williams majority decision failed to rest its holding 
on the coercive setting under which the speech took place. A coer­
cive setting is necessary for a finding of interrogation within the 
meaning of the fifth amendment. Accordingly, the "tantamount to 
interrogation" language should have no precedential value for Innis 
or for other fifth amendment cases. l40 
Even if the Williams interrogation language initially provides 
guidance for fifth amendment cases, two further considerations 
counsel against placing primary reliance upon it. First, four Jus­
tices dissented vigorously to the Williams majority's classification of 
the Christian burial speech as tantamount to interrogation. l4l The 
views of interrogation taken by the dissenting Justices are "dis­
turbing" to one noted commentator. l42 Their opinions show deep 
137. See text accompanying notes 68 & 78 supra. 
138. Grano, supra note 114, at 41 n.260. 
139. This assertion presumes that the Williams majority considered the "Chris­
tian burial speech" to be an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda but not 
Massiah. Although it is possible that the Williams majority viewed the "burial" 
speech as a Massiah interrogation, this conclusion appears unlikely given the context 
in which the reference appeared. For example, prior to its "tantamount to interroga­
tion" language, the Williams Court stated "that Detective Learning deliberately and 
designedly set out to elicit information from Williams just as surely as ... if he had 
formally interrogated him." 430 U.S. at 399. This language suggests concern over the 
Miranda concept of a coercive setting where police pressures affect the accused's 
ability to make rational decisions, rather than the Massiah concept of the timing of 
the conversation. See Kamisar, supra note 73, at 4 n.27. Thus, it is fair to conclude 
that the interrogation language related to fifth amendment concerns and was consti­
tutionally irrelevant to the final sixth amendment holding of the Williams case. 
140. If W~lliams were analyzed as a Miranda fifth amendment case, strong ar­
guments could be made that the police conduct violated the protection against 
compelled self-incrimination. See Kamisar, supra note 73, at 23. A comparison of 
Innis with Williams would then be persuasive. 
141. 430 U.S. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 439 (Blackmun, J., with 
White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). 
142. See Kamisar, supra note 73, at 5-24. 
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division within the Court on the interrogation issue. Given the 
strong wording of the dissents and the cursory treatment given by 
the majority to the interrogation issue, Williams is not conclusive 
authority for fifth amendment interrogation issues. Second, if the 
subjective police officer standard, implicitly used by the Williams 
majority to determine whether an interrogation had occurred, were 
employed in fifth amendment cases the protections created by 
Miranda would be eroded. The Williams Court stated, "Detective 
Leaming deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information 
from Williams. "143 This language suggests that the test for an inter­
rogation must focus on the subjective intentions of the police. As 
discussed below,144 this test, standing alone, does not secure the 
amount of protection envisioned by Miranda for custodial suspects 
facing police-induced pressure to discuss the alleged crime. 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court should have placed little 
reliance on Williams' "tantamount to interrogation" language in de­
termining whether an impermissible interrogation of Innis oc­
curred. The Rhode Island court should have focused on whether the 
requisite degree of compulsion existed at the time Innis made his 
incriminating statement. Miranda requires such compulsion before 
an interrogation within the meaning of the fifth amendment will be 
found to have occurred. 
B. Rhode Island Suprerru: Court Analysis of Compulsion 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court did address the "potential . 
for compulsion" existing at the time of the police conversation in 
Innis. The court, however, did not employ the most workable 
standard in its evaluation of the conversation. In addition, its analy­
sis was incomplete. 
In analyzing the coercion aspect, the state supreme court re­
jected the state's key argument. The state maintained that the offi­
cer who made the handicapped child remarks was expressing con­
cern for public safety and not intentionally eliciting incriminating 
statements from Innis. The state argued that, since the police had 
not intended to coerce defendant, no interrogation occurred.145 In 
rejecting this analysis, the state court did not focus upon the 
undisclosed, subjective intention of the police during the conversa­
tion. Instead, the court looked to the subjective impressions of de­
143. 430 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added). 
144. See text accompanying notes 184-90 infra. 
145. 391 A.2d at 1162. 
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fendant upon hearing the conversation: "the defendant, alol1e in a 
police wagon with three officers at 4 a.m., underwent the same 
psychological pressures which moved Williams [the defendant in 
Brewer v. Williams] to lead police to the body of his victim."l46 
The test used by the court represents a better application of the 
Miranda rationale than the standard it rejected. The court's test is 
more harmonious with Miranda because Miranda was designed to 
provide the defendant with the means to resist the pressures of 
custodial interrogation, regardless of the inner motives of the po­
lice in conducting the session. As developed more fully below, 147 
police intent is an inadequate gauge for determining the presence 
of an interrogation. 
The state court test, which examines the subjective impres­
sions of the defendant, however, creates problems of proof. De­
termining how each person views his situation "would require a 
prescience which neither the police nor anyone else possesses. "148 
A more workable test is the objective, reasonable person standard 
discussed below. 149 
Another factor contributing to the weakness of the Rhode Is­
land decision was the incomplete discussion of the "potential for 
compulsion" upon which the impermissible interrogation was 
based. Miranda was premised upon the presence of the potential 
for compelled self-incriminating statements. ISO The Miranda Court 
examined the physical surroundings and the atmosphere of police­
dominated settings and their impact upon the defendant to de­
termine if the potential for compelled self-incrimination existed. 
Interrogation within Miranda was described in terms of po­
lice-created compulsion that impaired the capacity of the defen­
dant to decide rationally whether to talk with the police. lSI To de­
termine if Miranda extended to the nonstationhouse setting of 
Innis, the state court should have asked, under the most workable 
test, if there were sufficiently compelling circumstances to prevent 
a reasonable person in the position of Innis from deciding rationally 
whether to talk to the police. Factors to consider would have in­
cluded the amount, of contact between Innis and the police, the 
146. ld. 
147. See text accompanying notes 184-90 infra. 
148. United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 
U.S. 990 (1970). 
149. See text accompanying notes 193-206 infra. 
150. 384 U.S. at 461. 
151. ld. at 465, 467. 
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content of the conversation, a comparison of the police car setting 
with the stationhouse setting found sufficiently compelling in 
Miranda, the time of day, the number, demeanor, and rank of the 
police involved, and any other important factors influencing com­
pulsion. The state court only focused on the time of the conversa­
tion, its location, and the number of individuals present. 152 
In conclusion, the Rhode Island Supreme Court based its find­
ing of a fifth amendment interrogation upon a sixth amendment 
case and upon a subjective custodial defendant standard that in­
volves difficult problems of proof. Nevertheless, the result reached 
by the state court is supportable under a fully developed, reason­
able person test. 153 
IV. BURGER COURT MAJORITY DECISION 
After reviewing the Innis interrogation issue, the United 
States Supreme Court held: 
the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in 
custody is subjected to either express questioning or its func­
tional equivalent. That is to say, the term "interrogation" under 
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any 
words or actions on the part of the police (other than those nor­
mally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should 
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response 
from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses pri­
marily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the in­
tent of the police. 154 
Although there are laudable aspects to the decision,155 it signifi­
cantly reduces the protections Miranda provided for the custodial 
suspeCt subjected to compelling police pressures to talk about the 
alleged crime. The decision must also be read to reject an ap­
proach that more faithfully adheres to the underlying goals of 
Miranda. ISS 
152. 391 A.2d at 1162. 
153. See text accompanying notes 193-206 infra. 
154. 446 U.S. at 300-01. 
155. In defining interrogation, the Court did not limit itself to express ques­
tioning, but included certain "words or actions on the part of the police." Id. at 
298-99. This view reflects a reasoned understanding of Miranda which dealt with the 
interrogation environment created by a variety of stationhouse custodial interrogation 
practices. As one commentator observed, "unless Miranda and the privilege against 
self-incrimination it is designed to effectuate were to become empty gestures in cus­
todial surroundings, the Court could not have intended to limit their applicability to 
only ... verbal conduct ending in question marks." Kamisar, supra note 73, at 14. 
156. See text following note 194 infra. 
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The test enunciated by the Court is primarily an objective, 
reasonable police officer standard. The Court also included a sub­
jective police test as one factor to consider in arriving at a final 
conclusion. This note analyzes both tests ~nd the problems inher­
ent in each. / 
A. Objective, Reasonable Police Officer Test 
Examination of the Court's definition of interrogation reveals 
an objective, reasonable police officer test. The Court held that an 
interrogation occurs either through express police questioning or 
through any police words or actions that the police should know 
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 
suspect. 157 This test should be rejected for numerous reasons. 
First, it is a substantial departure from the foundations of Miranda. 
Miranda was designed to alert the suspect in custodial interroga­
tion settings of his right to remain silent. 158 The warnings were 
created to ensure that the suspect was made aware of his rights at 
a time when he was confused and uncertain as to the tactics his 
captors were prepared to employ in order to obtain a confession. 159 
Ideally, Miranda calls for evaluation of the "potential for compul­
sion" needed to find an interrogation from the viewpoint of each 
suspect placed in a police-dominated setting. This test would be 
difficult to apply, however, because the workings of an individual 
mind are too complex for a truly subjective standard. Further, 
courts cannot be expected to decide cases solely on the basis of 
self-serving statements by defendants. ISO 
The Innis Court's objective police officer standard, however, 
erodes the protections created by Miranda in viewing interrogation 
through the eyes of the police. The decision enables the police to 
devise interrogation techniques and then forces the courts to judge 
the acceptability of the tactics according to the standards of the 
creator. The erosion is particularly significant because many of the 
protections envisioned by Miranda for the custodial suspect have 
not materialized. One commentator found that the police are likely 
to use any interrogation tactic that has not been expressly prohib­
ited by the courts. lSI Moreover, in analyzing the circumstances 
157. 446 U.S. at 301. 
158. 384 U.S. at 467. 
159. Kamisar, supra note 78, at 51. See also 384 U.S. at 467. 
160. Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes 
Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C. L. REV. 699, 713 (1974). 
161. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 
598 (1979). 
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surrounding an interrogation, many trial judges are tempted to de­
fer to the judgment of the police. 162 When the new Court test is 
superimposed upon these realities, the protection of the custodial 
suspect is further jeopardized. 
A second objection to the objective police officer test is the 
failure of the Court to anticipate problems of proof that surely will 
develop. In footnote eight, the Court stated, "any knowledge the 
police may have had concerning the unusual susceptibility of a de­
fendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an important 
factor in determining whether the police should have known that 
their words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an in­
criminating response from the suspect. "163 The Court did not indi­
cate how obvious the special susceptibility must be before the po­
lice will be held to have known about the reasonably likely effect of 
their words or actions. As Chief Justice Burger observed in his 
concurring opinion, "few ... police officers are competent to make 
the kind of evaluation . . . contemplated; even a psychiatrist . . . 
would . . . employ extensive . . . observation to make the judg­
ment now charged to police officers."164 
The substance of footnote eight is also objectionable because it 
focuses attention on one defendant in one setting. Courts are not 
asked to evaluate the coerciveness of specific police tactics upon a 
reasonable person in the position of the suspect. Thus, the limited 
amount of protection provided by the footnote is available only on 
a case-by-case basis. The Court did not compensate for the limita­
tions of footnote eight in any other manner. If the Court had also 
employed the objective, reasonable person test in conjunction with 
footnote eight, then defendants with "normal" susceptibilities, as 
well as defendants with "unusual" susceptibilities, would be pro­
tected. But the Court rejected the reasonable person test in favor 
of the objective police officer standard. Thus, a decision in one 
case will provide little or no guidance in another case involving a ­
different defendant with different susceptibilities. The conse­
quences of such a pure case-by-case approach have been aptly de­
scribed. Former United States Supreme Court Justice Clark stated 
that, by use of the case-by-case approach, "we do not shape the 
conduct of local police one whit; unpredictable reversals on dissim­
ilar fact situations are not likely to curb the zeal of the police and 
162. [d. -
163. 446 U.S. at 302 n.B. 
164. [d. at 304 (Burger, C.]., concurring). 
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prosecutors who may be intent on racking up a high percentage of 
successful prosecutions. "165 Similarly, since the courts and police 
will receive little guidance from prior cases in applying the new 
Innis test, the danger that the police will conduct their interroga­
tions without regard for the constitutional rights of the suspect in­
creases. 1SS 
The problems inherent in the Court's objective police officer 
standard become apparent upon application of the test to the Innis 
facts. The Court examined the subject matter of th~ po4ce officer's 
remarks, the length of the police-suspect conversation, the de­
meanor of the suspect, and the number of police present during 
the conversation. 
Analysis of the content of the conversation is an important fac­
tor that deserves considerable weight. Trickery and deceit are sta­
ples of current police interrogation practices1S7 and often success­
fully produce confessions. For example, one widely read manual 
outlines specific techniques to be used in interrogating a suspect. 
Most of the techniques involve some form of deception because the 
officer is required to make statements that he knows are untrue or 
to playa role that is inconsistent with his actual feelings. l68 The 
Supreme Court did not find the police comments about 
handicapped children to be "particularly evocative" under the ob­
jective police officer test. 1S9 The dissents strongly disagreed with 
this conclusion. Their belief that the comments were highly evoca­
tive presents the better view, either because they realistically ap­
plied the objective police officer test170 or because a reasonable 
person in the place of Innis would have responded to the com­
ments just as Innis reacted. l71 
In applying the objective police officer test the Court exam­
ined several factors contributing to the atmosphere in which the 
police-suspect exchange occurred. These factors demand consider­
able weight because together they describe the -level of coercion 
present during the exchange. The Miranda safeguards were de­
165. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1954) (Clark, J., concurring) 
(evaluating the case-by-case voluntariness approach used prior to Miranda). 
166. White, supra note 161, at 597. 
167. Id. at 581. 
168. Id. at 582. 
169. 446 U.S. at 303. 
170. Justices Marshall and Brennan applied the objective police officer 
standard in a realistic manner and could "scarcely imagine a stronger appeal to the 
conscience of a suspect." Id. at 306 (Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting). 
171. See text accompanying notes 201-06 infra. 
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signed to protect a custodial suspect from police-induced pressures 
that might impair his ability to determine freely whether to talk 
with the police. Thus, careful analysis of the surrounding circum­
stances is crucial to Miranda. The Innis Court looked at the length 
of the police-suspect exchange and noted that it was brief. 172 The 
Court also considered defendant's demeanor. The Court found 
nothing in the record to suggest that the police knew that Innis 
was unusually disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest. 173 The 
Court also mentioned that the handicapped children remarks were 
exchanged between two police officers. 174 The Court was im­
pressed that the police neither invited a response from Innis175 nor 
carried on a lengthy harangue in his presence. 176 These factors 
were not impressive to the dissenters. Justices Marshall and 
Brennan stated that, "Gleckman's remarks would obviously have 
constituted interrogation if they had been explicitly directed to re­
spondent, and the result should not be different because they were 
nominally addressed to [Officer] McKenna."177 Justice Stevens 
found that the majority had turned Miranda's unequivocal rule 
against any interrogation at all into a trap in which unwary suspects 
might be caught by police deception. According to Justice Stevens, 
"if a suspect does not appear to be susceptible to a particular type 
of psychological pressure, the police are apparently free to exert 
that pressure on him despite his request for counsel, so long as 
they are careful not to punctuate their statements with question 
marks."178 The dissents present the better view since Miranda was 
concerned with the impact of police pressures upon the custodial 
suspect. 179 Thus, it is immaterial whether the police remarks were 
directed to Innis or to a fellow police officer. The crucial fact re­
mains that the police remarks created an atmosphere of coercion 
that caused Innis to respond by incriminating himself. 180 
In its examination of the surrounding circumstances under the 
objective police officer test, the majority failed to consider the po­
lice car setting in which the conversation occurred. This factor de­
mands the most analysis and its resolution merits the most weight 
172. 446 U.S. at 30. 
173. [d. at 302-03. 
174. [d. at 302. 
175. [d. 
176. [d. at 303. 
177. [d. at 306 (Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting). 
178. [d. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
179. See text accompanying notes 68-76 supra. 
180. This result would have been foreseeable under the reasonable person test, 
discussed in text accompanying notes 193-206 infra. 
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in the overall interrogation decision because Miranda focused on 
the potential for compulsion created by the police-dominated envi­
ronment in which a custodial interrogation took place. 181 Removing 
the defendant from the psychological support of friends, relatives, 
and familiar surroundings can create significant pressures that im­
pair the defendant's capacity to decide rationally whether to talk to 
the police. It is thus noteworthy that the Court made no mention 
of the police car setting in which the conversation occurred. The 
omission is even more glaring because many lower courts have 
found the existence of a custodial interrogation when the police­
suspect exchange occurred in or near a police vehicle. 182 These 
181. See text accompanying notes 73-79 supra. 
182. In United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977) the Court de­
scribed the coerciveness of the police car setting: 
[t]he prisoner and police officers are in close contact within a confined area. 
Often, the inside door handles are removed and the front and back seats are 
separated by wire mesh ... Invariably, the prisoner is handcuffed.. He is ef­
fectively cut off from the world outside the patrol car. As a practical matter, 
he has no access to friends or counsel. If the prisoner has just been arrested, 
he may still be disoriented and apprehensive in an often hostile and' alien 
setting. In short, the back seat of a patrol car as the setting for a confession 
conforms in all respect(s) to the "incommunicado, police-dominated" atmos­
phere which led the Supreme Court in Miranda ... to recognize the need 
for special procedures to minimize the inherent coerciveness of custodial in­
terrogation. 
[d. at 551. In Myers v. State, 3 Md. App. 534, 240 A.2d 288 (1968), defendant, who 
was the prime suspect in a murder investigation, was located by police, placed in a 
police car with two officers, and interrogated as the car moved to police headquar­
ters. The court held that defendant had been subjected to custodial interrogation. 
The court found that the atmosphere created at the time of the questioning carried 
"its own badge of intimidation." [d. at 538, 240 A.2d at 291. The court appeared to 
use an objective, reasonable person test. It cited language from People v. Hazel, 252 
Cal. App. 2d 412, 60 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1967) which stated that the custodial require­
ment of Miranda depended on the reasonable belief of the suspect that his freedom 
of movement or action is restricted by the interrogation. [d. at 537, 240 A.2d at 290. 
Although the Myers court addressed the custodial and not the interrogation issue, the 
tests for both issues should be identical. See note 187 infra. In United States v. 
Kennedy, 573 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1978), defendant was confined to the back seat of a 
Federal Bureau of Investigation [hereinafter referred to as the FBI] vehicle with one 
agent. A second agent sat in the front seat during questioning which lasted forty-five 
minutes. The court used an objective, reasonable person test because it asked if a 
reasonable person would have believed himself to be in custody. [d. at 660. Al­
though the Kennedy court addressed the custodial issue, the test for custody and in­
terrogation should be the same. See note 187 infra. The Kennedy court found that 
the totality of the circumstances supported the reasonable belief that defendant was 
in .custody. 573 F.2d at 660. No custodial interrogation was found to have occurred in 
State v. Inman, 350 A.2d 582 (Me. 1976), when defendant was questioned by detec­
tives in a police car en route to the police station. Defendant had not been arrested, 
the investigation had not focused on him, he was in control of the situation, and he 
was free from physical restraint. Hence, no coercive police atmosphere existed. The 
812 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:787 . 
lower court cases suggest that, even under the objective police offi­
cer test, Innis could have been subjected to considerable compul­
sion to incriminate himself. 
The Court also failed to discuss the time of day during which 
the arrest and conversation took place. Lower courts have included 
this factor in their analyses of the custodial interrogation issue. 183 
This factor, in conjunction with others, conceivably could have cre­
ated sufficient compulsion to justify a finding of interrogation even 
under the objective police officer test. These analytical omissions 
show that the Court failed to examine the Innis facts in sufficient 
scope or depth to support its conclusion that no interrogation 
occurred under the objective police officer test. The Court also 
failed to indicate whether the overall interrogation decision rested 
primarily upon the conclusion that the police statement was not 
"particularly evocative" or upon the absence of sufficiently compel­
ling surrounding circumstances. This failure to specifY precisely 
what factors were crucial to the final decision hinders identification 
of generally objectionable interrogation tactics that should be ille­
gal per se. The courts, therefore, have not been told how to apply 
the new Innis standard consistently. 
B. Subjective Police Officer Factor 
In footnote seven, the United States Supreme Court stated 
that the 
court used an objective, reasonable person test in concluding that no reasonable per­
son in defendant's position could have considered himself to be in custody at the 
time. [d. at 598-99. Similarly, no ~ustodial interrogation was found to have occurred 
in United States v. Akin, 435 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1011 
(1971), when FBI agents. questioned defendant in a Bureau car but used no force, 
made no promises to induce defendant to give information, and left defendant 
free to go at all times. The court appeared to use an objective, reasonable person test 
based upon the factors it considered controlling: Lack of restraint, lack of promises to 
induce the suspect to talk, and lack of force in questioning. [d. at 1013. But see 
McCrary v. State, 529 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. App. 1975), in which the court found no cus­
todial interrogation when police handcuffed and searched defendant after the latter 
approached the police car and made suspicious movements toward his back pocket. 
The court found no "compelling police atmosphere." [d. at 475. The court examined 
the surrounding circumstances including the subjective intent of the police officer to 
reach its decision. [d. For additional cases dealing with questioning in or near a po­
lice vehicle, see Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 § 14 (1970). 
183. For example, in Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 456 Pa. 288, 318 A.2d 713, 
cerl. denied, 419 U.S. 1092 (1974), the court held that defendant was subjected to 
custodial interrogation when he was questioned in the middle of the night in a pri­
vate room of the police building after the investigation had focused on him. The 
court concluded that the police were not involved in an innocent attempt to gather 
information. The court used a multiprong test because it stated that the Miranda 
safeguards were required when there is custody plus police conduct calculated to, 
expected to, or likely to evoke admissions. [d. at 292-93, 318 A.2d at 715. 
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intent of the police ... may well have a bearing on whether the 
police should have known that their words or actions were rea­
sonably likely to ·evoke an incriminating response. In particular, 
where a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating re­
sponse . . . it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one 
which the police should have known was reasonably likely to 
have that effect. 184 
By including the subjective element of police intent within the 
overall objective police officer test, the Court probably meant to 
ensure the broadest possible protection of the right against 
compelled self-incrimination. In those cases where the police 
clearly intended to elicit an incriminating response from a custodial 
suspect in violation of the Miranda procedures, a court presumably 
would have little difficulty satisfying the objective, reasonable po­
lice officer test upon which the Court places primary reliance. The 
subjective police intent factor is unreliable in several respects, how­
ever, so its inclusion does little to improve the objectionable fea­
tures of the Court's principal standard, the objective police officer 
test. This leaves the majority with two tests, neither of which is to­
tally reliable standing alone or in conjunction with the other. The 
Court failed to correct this problem because it did not include an 
objective, reasonable person test for those cases where the objec­
tive or subjective police officer tests fail to provide reliable an­
swers. 
Among the problems inherent in a subjective police officer 
test is the matter of proof. A sophisticated officer, aware that his or 
her intent will determine the admissibility of vital evidence, might 
not testify candidly about the motivation for talking to or near the 
suspect. ISS A second problem hampering the effectiveness of the 
subjective police standard is its focus upon the undisclosed inten­
tions of the police. Miranda was designed to protect the fifth 
amendment rights of the suspect in coercive custodial settings re­
gardless of the inner motivations of the participating police. 
Finally, most courts judge the issue of custody without regard to 
the subjective intentions of the police. ISS A similar approach 
should be taken regarding the interrogation issue. IS7 
184. 446 u.S. at 301-02 n.7. 
185. White, supra note 21, at 66. 
186. Most lower courts which have expressly considered the issue of custody 
have adopted an objective reasonable person test. See Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888 
(Alaska 1979) (collecting cases). 
187. Miranda was designed to vest the custodial suspect with protections 
against compelled self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 461. The protections do not apply 
unless both custody and interrogation are present. ld. at 445. Since both custody and 
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In applying the subjective factor to the Innis facts, the Court 
observed that the record in no way suggested that the officers' re­
marks were designed to elicit a response. l88 Justice Stevens dis­
agreed. He noted that the officers probably were aware that the 
chances of a handicapped child finding the missing weapon at a 
time when the police were not present were relatively slim. l89 
Further, the officer responding to the initial handicapped children 
remark did not suggest that they cordon off the area or notify 
school officials. Instead, he emphasized that the police had to find 
the weapon to avert a child's death. l9o Thus, the true purpose of 
the conversation was probably not to voice genuine concern for the 
welfare of the handicapped children. 
C. Summary of Supreme Court Majority Test 
In summary, the objective and subjective police officer tests 
set out by the United States Supreme Court majority to determine 
the existence of a Miranda interrogation erode the underlying 
premises of Miranda. Miranda sought to create a balance between 
the interests of the police in obtaining confessions and the interests 
of the custodial suspect in exercising his right against compelled 
self-incrimination. Innis tips the scale in favor of the police by 
using unreliable tests for the determination of an interrogation. 
The Innis tests focus only on the objective or subjective actions of 
the police and fail to consider how a reasonable person in the sus­
pect's position would react to the police actions. The Court's omis­
sion of the reasonable person standard leaves the suspect unpro­
tected in those cases where problems ofproof hamper the reliability 
of either Innis test. The Court's unwillingness to explain its re­
jection of the balance established by Miranda and its restrictive 
conclusion itself, however, are consistent with the approach taken 
by the Burger Court in recent years in dealing with other Miranda 
issues. 19l 
interrogation involve the impact of police behavior on the defendant, the same ana­
lytical test should be used to determine their presence. 
188. 446 U.S. at 303 n.9. 
189. Id. at 316 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting), quoting White, supra note 21, at 
68. 
190. Brief of the Respondent Innis at 24, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 
291. 
191. See Stone, supra note 3, at 169. The Burger Court has been dismantling 
Miranda in a piecemeal fashion by manipulating fringe issues yet leaving its core in­
tact. Id. Evidence elicited from an individual through custodial interrogation when 
he has not been warned properly of his rights is still inadmissible for use in the 
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prosecution's case in chief. At the same time, however, the Court has allowed re­
newed interrogation of an individual who previously asserted his right to remain si­
lent. See discussion below of Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). The Court has 
also defined the concept "custodial" narrowly. See discussion below of Oregon v. 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977). Further, the majority has not excluded evidence 
solely on Miranda grounds in the last ten years. See Stone, supra note 3, at 10l. See 
also Grano, supra note 129, at 3 n.17. The sole exception occurred in Tagne v. 
Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980). The Court ruled that an inculpatory statement made 
by the suspect to a police officer was inadmissible because there was no evidence 
proving that the suspect knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights be­
fore making the statement. Id. at 47l. In New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, the 
Court held that "a person's testimony before a grand jury under a grant of immunity 
cannot constitutionally be used to impeach him when he is a defendant in a later 
criminal trial." Id. at 459-60. The Court based its ruling on the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments, id. at 459, and not on Miranda. The Innis result clearly fits within this 
established pattern. Innis also employs the multi-variable analysis used by the Court 
to decide if Miranda protections apply. 
Comparison of Innis with two other Supreme Court decisions demonstrates nu­
merous analytical similarities. In Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), the Court 
held that the Miranda dicta requiring all interrogation to cease once an individual 
indicates a desire to remain silent, did not create a per se rule against all further in­
terrogation. The Mosley Court noted that its decision did not deal with the proce­
dures to be followed after a suspect asserted his right to counsel. Id. at 101 n.7. The 
decision only concerned the procedures to be followed after assertion of the right to 
remain silent. The right to counsel issue was present in Innis but was not addressed 
by any of the courts. They dealt only with the definition of interrogation. The Mosley 
Court upheld the admissibility of statements obtained in a later interrogation on the 
ground that the initial assertion of Miranda rights "had been scrupulously honored." 
Id. at 103 (quoting 384 U.S. at 479). As in Innis, the Mosley Court examined a variety 
of factors including the different location of the second interrogation, use of a differ­
ent interrogator, a lapse of two hours between the two sessions, a new set of warn­
ings that preceded the second interrogation, and the allegedly different subject mat­
ter covered in each meeting. Id. at 104. The Court failed to indicate which factors it 
considered essential to meet its announced standard and thus the decision provides 
ambiguous protection for the suspect due to its unpredictable application. Stone, su­
pra note 3, at 135. The same can be said of Innis. See text accompanying note 166 
supra. 
In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977), the Court took a restrictive view 
of the meaning of "custody." The Court held that defendant was not subjected to 
custodial interrogation, even though while on parole he was asked to go to police 
headquarters for questioning, was told that the police believed he was involved in a 
crime, and was falsely informed that his fingerprints had been found at the scene of 
the crime. Id. at 493-95. The Court again failed to indicate which of the many factors 
discussed were crucial to the decision. Stone, supra note 3, at 153. Undoubtedly, the 
decision will have the same unpredictable results discussed above. The Court also 
appeared to focus on the subjective intentions of the police officer; it did not use a 
reasonable person test. Stone, supra note 3, at 153. Professor Stone argues that the 
Mathiason court used the subjective police officer test due to the factors deemed 
controlling by the majority: Mathiason went voluntarily to the police station, was ad­
vised he was not under arrest, and left the police station without hindrance. The 
Court thought it irrelevant that Mathiason was on parole at the time, that the ques­
tioning occurred behind closed doors, that the police implied that a prosecution was 
likely and that they indicated that they had substantial evidence of Mathiason's guilt. 
Id. The Innis Court also used a subjective police officer intent test in reaching its 
decision. See text accompanying notes 184-90 supra. 
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D. Return to Voluntariness Standard 
The analysis used by the Burger Court in its treatment of 
Innis and other Miranda cases suggests a rejection of a wooden, 
"prophylactic" application of Miranda and a return to the multi­
factor voluntariness standard used prior to Miranda. 192 Although it 
is beyond the scope of this note to comment on the merits of the 
multifactor test, the Court could still achieve a "principled" appli­
cation of Miranda by employing an objective, reasonable person 
standard against which to judge the many factors present in each 
case, rather than the tests used in Innis and earlier cases. Under 
the reasonable person standard, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
finding of an "interrogation" would be affirmed. 
V. INNIS VIEWED 

FROM A REASONABLE PERSON PERSPECTIVE 

Justice Stevens dissented to the Innis definition of interroga­
tion and advanced an alternative. Under his definition, "any police 
conduct or statements that would appear to a reasonable person in 
the suspect's position to call for a response must be considered 'in­
terrogation' ... as well as those [statements] that are designed to 
do so. "193 The entire test has merit. First, the objective, reason­
able person standard avoids the problems of proof inherent in any 
subjective test. As Judge Friendly wrote regarding the custodial 
issue: 
the [Miranda] Court could scarcely have intended the issue 
. . . to be decideQ by swearing contests in which officers would 
regularly maintain their lack of intention to assert power over a 
suspect save when the circumstances would make such a claim 
absurd, and defendants would assert with equal regularity that 
they considered themselves to be significantly deprived of their 
liberty the minute officers began to inquire of them. 194 
The comment is equally valid when a subjective test is used to de­
termine the presence of an interrogation. 
A second reason to utilize the reasonable person test is its 
preservation of the balance envisioned by Miranda. The test pro­
vides the defendant with adequate protection from the potential of 
police coercion, as viewed by a reasonable person in the place of 
the defendant. The test does not, however, completely tie the 
192. See Stone, supra note 3 at 168. 
193. 446 U.S. at 311 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
194. United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 
U.S. 990 (1970). 
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hands of the police. It does not require the police to anticipate the 
frailties or idiosyncrasies of every person with whom they interact 
or'speak. 
Third, the test enables the courts to identify those tactics that 
are objectionable in any factual setting. The test focuses on the re­
sponse of a reasonable person in a coercive setting, not on the re­
sponse of one particular suspect. This approach would provide the 
police and the courts with more direction and certainty in inter­
preting the law. Thus, though Miranda would be applied on a 
case-by-case basis, there would be continuity to the decisions. As a 
consequence, protection of the fifth amendment interests of the 
custodial suspect would be increased. 
Finally, inclusion of the subjective police officer portion of the 
definition, in addition to the objective, reasonable person segment, 
assures the broadest possible protection of the right to be free from 
interrogation once the suspect is in custody and in a police­
dominated environment. When the police clearly intended to elicit 
an incriminating response from a custodial suspect in violation of 
Miranda, an illegal interrogation would be found, without inquiry 
as to whether the reasonable person test was satisfied. While prob­
lems of proof remain unresolved in the subjective portion of Justice 
Stevens' test,195 their significance is reduced since this is not the 
sole standard under which an interrogation would be analyzed. 
Justice Stevens also included the reasonable person test within his 
definition. In contrast, the Innis majority failed to include an ob­
jective, reasonable person standard within its definition of interroga­
tion. This omission magnifies the problems of proof inherent in the 
majority's subjective police officer standard. The majority thus 
relies on two tests, the objective police officer test and the subjec­
tive police officer test, both lacking in complete reliability, to de­
termine the presence of an interrogation. 
When Innis is analyzed under an objective, reasonable person 
test, the potential for coercion that must exist for a Miranda inter­
rogation clearly is present. The police conversation generated pres­
sures and anxieties that a reasonable person would find compelling. 
First, the content of the conversation challenged Innis to display 
some evidence of honor and decency. Police manuals indicate that 
criminal suspects are susceptible to such challenges and list them 
as a standard and often successful interrogation tactic. 196 As aptly 
phrased by dissenting Justices Marshall and Brennan, "one can 
scarcely imagine a stronger appeal to the conscience of a suspect 
195. See text accompanying note 185 supra. 

196, See White, supra note 161, at 581. 

818 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:787 
than the assertion that if the weapon is not found an . . . inno- . 
cent person will be hurt ... a helpless, handicapped little girl. "197 
It is likely that a reasonable person in Innis' position would find 
such a challenge so compelling as to demand the response given by 
Innis. This factor deserves considerable weight. 198 
The setting in which the conversation occurred was highly 
coercive from the perspective of a reasonable person in the posi­
tion of Innis. The "handicap" remarks took place in a police car 
where Innis sat handcuffed with three uniformed officers199 after 
he had been arrested at gunpoint. 200 Many courts have found that 
custodial interrogations occurred under an objective, reasonable 
person test when a police officer spoke with an accused in a police 
vehicle. 201 Other courts have carefully examined the effect that 
handcuffs, a drawn gun, and the presence of several uniformed po­
lice officers have on the demeanor of the accused and have found 
that custodial interrogations transpired under the objective, reason­
able person test or a subjective test. 202 Further, one commentator 
has found that, in custodial settings where the norm governing spa­
tial distance is violated, a person's instantaneous response is to 
back up, again and again. When unable to escape, the person be­
comes more anxious and unsure. 203 Additionally, although the 
length of the police conversation was brief, it occurred at 4:30 a.m. 
Other courts have found an interrogation to have occurred at such 
an hour under similar circumstances using an objective, reasonable 
person test. 204 Finally, the remarks themselves were compelling in 
that they appeared to call for a response from a reasonable person 
197. 446 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting). 
198. See text accompanying notes 167-69 supra. 
199. 446 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting). 
200. Brief of the Respondent Innis at 4, Rhode Island v. Innis, id. 
201. See cases cited in note 182 supra. 
202. For example, in State v. Paz, 31 Or. App. 851, 572 P.2d 1036 (1977), the 
court found that defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation after he was 
handcuffed at gunpoint, taken into custody, transported in the back seat of a police 
car to the police station, and informed that he was a suspect. The Court used an 
objective, reasonable person test. [d. at 859, 572 P.2d at 1041. In People v. Shivers, 
21 N.Y.2d 118, 233 N.E.2d 836, 286 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1967), the court found that com­
pulsion was manifest when defendant was questioned on the street by police 
at gunpoint about his activities. The court used two subjective tests. It stated that 
the officer had no intention of letting defendant escape and that defendant could 
have reached no different conclusion. [d. at 122, 233 N.E.2d at 839, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 
830. 
203. Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. 
REV. 42, 44-46 (1968). 
204. See Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 456 Pa. 288, 318 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 109 (1974). 
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in the place of Innis. As noted by Justice Stevens, the conversation 
indicated that the police had a strong desire to learn the location of 
the shotgun. Any person with knowledge of the weapon's location 
would be likely to believe that the officers wanted him to disclose 
that site. Thus, an individual would believe that the officers were 
seeking to solicit precisely the type of response given by Innis. 205 
It is clear that the setting in which Innis made his incrim­
inating statements was highly coercive as viewed from a reason­
able person standard. This conclusion is the most important factor 
in the interrogation analysis because the Miranda protections were 
designed to dispel the atmosphere of coercion that accompanies 
custodial interrogations. 206 
In summary, by employing the same multivariable analysis 
used by the Burger Court in previous Miranda cases, but by using 
an objective, reasonable person standard to assess the importance 
of each variable, it is clear that there was sufficient compulsion at 
the time of the Innis police conversation to endanger defendant's 
fifth amendment right. The compulsion exceeded that which would 
have existed in mere arrest and detention. Thus, Innis was interro­
gated within the meaning of Miranda. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Miranda sought to create a balance between the right of the 
suspect to exercise his fifth amendment privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination and the interests of the police in obtaining con­
fessions. Miranda requires the police to issue certain warnings to 
the cl.}-stodial suspect and lays out specific procedures once a sus­
pect IS subjected to "custodial interrogation." Courts have strug­
gled with this balance since Miranda by trying to refine the mean­
ings of "custodial" and "interrogation." The United States Supreme 
Court has unnecessarily tipped the balance in favor of the police by 
its restrictive definition of "interrogation" in Innis. The Innis Court 
has created two tests to evaluate the potential for compulsion 
which must exist prior to a finding of an interrogation. The tests fo­
cus solely upon the viewpoint of the police, without any reference 
to the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the suspect's position. 
The Court has failed to preserve the balance envisioned by 
Miranda. It remains to be seen whether the lower courts will en­
thusiastically adopt the Innis standards. 
Jane Schussler 
205. 446 U.S. at 312-13 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting White, supra note 
218, at 68). 
206. Id. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
